Many cryptographic solutions based on pseudorandom functions for common problems like encryption, message-authentication or challenge-response protocols have the following feature: There is a stateful counter based version of the scheme that has high security, but if, to avoid the use of state, we substitute a random value for the counter, the security of the scheme drops below the birthday bound. In some situations the use of counters or other forms of state is impractical or unsafe. Can we get security b e y ond the birthday bound without using counters?
Introduction
Pseudorandom functions 8 are an essential tool in many cryptographic solutions. They can be used to generate a pseudorandom pad for symmetric encryption, to mask a universal hash function for producing a secure message-authentication MAC, to implement secure challenge-response mechanisms, and so on. In practice, one might use, in the role of pseudorandom functions, various concrete primitives, such as block ciphers or keyed hash functions under the assumption that they do possess the pseudorandomness properties in question. The danger of repetition. In usages of pseudorandom functions such as those mentioned above, the same pseudorandom function will be applied to many v alues in the function's domain. In many such cases, security can be compromised if one applies the pseudorandom function twice to the same point. Consider as an example the following method of encryption. Two parties share a key which speci es a function f: f0; 1g n ! f 0 ; 1 g m from some xed pseudorandom function family. In order to encrypt a message M of length m, the sender computes f on an element v 2 f 0 ; 1 g n and then sends the pair v;Mfv. Clearly, the security o f s u c h a s c heme depends on never re-using the same value v for encrypting di erent messages. The same problem arises in other applications of pseudorandom functions, including MACs and challenge-response protocols.
Counters versus coins
Using counters. A natural way to avoid repetition is for the sender to use as the points on which t o e v aluate the function an increasing counter, or other form of varying, non-repeating state, which is updated with each application of the function. This does very well in terms of avoiding repetition, but can have v arious drawbacks depending on the setting and application.
Maintaining a counter, or other state information, might in some settings be impractical or unsafe. This can happen, for example, whenever maintaining a synchronized state across di erent applications of the function is unsafe or impossible. Such is the case of a function that is used across di erent sessions or invocations of a protocol, or used possibly simultaneously by di erent users or components of a system. Additional examples include the use of smart-cards, or authentication tokens, that store the key to a pseudorandom function in persistent memory but are not equipped with non-volatile writeable memory to store the varying value of a counter. Even in cases where such a varying state can be stored, security is susceptible to system failures that may reset the value of that counter.
Also some applications require more for security than mere non-repetitiveness of the value to which the pseudorandom function is applied; e.g., the value might be a challenge which should beunpredictable, and a counter value is of course highly predictable. In this case too, the use of counters is not possible at all. Using coins. Another possibility is to use random values as those on which to evaluate the function. This can avoid the need to store varying information, and also yield unpredictability, thereby avoiding the drawbacks of counters. However, randomness might do less well at the task we rst highlighted, namely avoiding repetition. This is due to the birthday" phenomenon, which means that if the domain of the function has size N = 2 n , and we apply the function to a sequence of q points selected at random from the domain, we have probability about q 2 =N of seeing a repetition in the selected points. In the encryption example discussed above, this represents a signi cant decrease in the numberof messages that can besafely encrypted: only p N if we use random values for the point v, but up to N depending on the security of the pseudorandom function family if we use counters.
Construction Insecurity
No. f -appls. 2n ! f0; 1g n given f : f0; 1g n ! f0; 1g n . The insecurity is the maximum adversarial success inueries. Both upper bounds and lower bounds attacks on the insecurity are shown. Here N = 2 n . No. f -apps" is the number of applications of f used in one computation of g, and is the main cost. Feistel-t" means t rounds, and CBC-2" means CBC on two blocks. Constructions 2,3,4,6 yield maps of 2n bits to 2n bits; in our context it is implicit that the outputs are truncated. Question marks mean we don't know. See the text for even more discussion.
Thus the birthday bound for query collisions may become the security bottleneck of the whole application. This is particularly evident when using 64-bit input pseudorandom functions, such a s those based on DES. In this case a numberq= 2 32 of queries nulli es the quanti ed security; even q = 2 25 leaves us with an insecurity ie. chance that the scheme may be broken of q 2 =N = 2 , 14 , which is fairly high. With 128-bit blocks such as in the AES proposals the probability of repeated queries leaves less security than usually intended: in this case q = 2 32 provides 2 ,64 insecurity, less than the usually conjectured 128-bit security" for these ciphers.
The above discussion raises the natural question of to what extent the use of varying state e.g. counters is essential for avoiding the quadratic degradation in the security of the function. In other words, can we combine the advantages of coins and counters: get security beyond the birthday bound, yet avoid the need to maintain state? Using input-length doubling transformations. One approach i s t o c hange the pseudorandom function and use instead one with a larger domain. For example, instead of f: f0; 1g n ! f0; 1g m , w e use a pseudorandom function g: f0; 1g 2n ! f 0 ; 1 g m . This however can be impractical, or may not increase security in the desired way, a s w e n o w discuss.
Since total redesign of the function is typically not desirable, one would usually try to build g in a generic way from f. Figure 1 summarizes the main known designs. It sets m = n for simplicity.
For example, one can use the popular CBC-MAC construction. Another alternative is to use one of many known transformations of pseudorandom functions on n bits to pseudorandom permutations or functions on 2n bits, and simply drop all but the last m bits of the output. Constructions 2,3,4,6 of the table fall in this class, while construction 5 is directly of 2n bits to n bits. Figure 1 indicates the best known analyses upper bounding the insecurity, the best known attacks lower bounding the insecurity, and the cost measured in terms of the number of applications of f needed to make one computation of g. As f-applications is relatively high. In particular, as we will see Figure 2 , it is higher than the cost of our methods discussed below.
The parity method and results in brief
Construction. In this paper we propose and investigate a simple mechanism to go beyond the birthday barrier without using counters or state information. We call it the parity method". Instead of computing the function at a single random point, compute it at several random but distinct points typically two or three points will su ce and take the parity of the results namely, XOR these values. For instance, in the above encryption example, if the sender wants to encrypt plaintext M, he will choose two di erent random values r 1 ; r 2 from the domain of the function, and send to the other party as the ciphertext the triple r 1 ; r 2 ; M f r 1 f r 2 . Similar methods will be used for other applications such a s c hallenge-response, message authentication, or key derivation. As a result our methods o er a sateless alternative t o a c hieve the high security of stateful schemes at a moderate computational cost but with increased use of random bits. Security. We are interested in proving general security properties of the parity method that can later be applied to prove the security of speci c encryption schemes such as the one discussed above or MAC s c hemes such a s w e will discuss below. Accordingly, w e begin by considering the probabilistic function that embodies the parity construct, namely where the r i 's are uniformly chosen di erent n-bit numbers. The rst security property w e consider is pseudorandomness, or distinguishability distance" from true randomness, of the randomized function F. This corresponds to passive attacks. The second security property w e call integrity", and it corresponds to certain kinds of active attacks. In the coming sections we will discuss these properties in more depth, and see how they apply to encryption and MAC respectively. In either case we are interested in how the security of this randomized function degrades afterueries relative to the security of the original pseudorandom function f. Our analyses reduce this question to a purely information-theoretic setting, and show that the parity method ampli es security at quite a high rate, enabling one to move w ell beyond the birthday barrier. Our results are displayed in Figure 2 and discussed below.
Pseudorandomness amplification and encryption. An adversary sees q vectors r 1 ; : : : ; r t and the output of the parity function on them. We de ne a certain bad" event and show that subject to its not happening, the outputs look uniform. Exploiting and extending a connection of 4 , the bad event is that a certain matrix associated to the vectors is not of full rank. Lemma 3.3 bounds this probability roughly by:
Ot! q 2 N t for q N e 2 t ; 2 where N = 2 n is the size of the domain of the function. 1 The bound on q is necessary: we note in Section 3.2 why the parity construct is not pseudorandom when q N . Remarkably, the bound Equation 2 shows that if f is chosen as a truly random function then the e ect of the parity construct of Equation 1 on limiting the degradation of security due to repeated queries is, for q O N=t and small t, close to the e ect of applying a random function on single inputs of length tn. Indeed, in the latter case the distance from randomness is, using the birthday argument, of the order of q 2 N t . That is, we approximate the e ect of a t-fold increase in the queries size without necessitating any c hange to the underlying function f. We note that the bound is tight.
The encryption scheme discussed above, a special case of the CTR scheme in 2 , was shown by the latter to have insecurity under a chosen-plaintext attack of q N messages at most , the maximum possible attainable advantage in breaking the underlying pseudorandom function inueries and time related to that allowed the encryption attacker. The insecurity of the randomized stateless version is only bounded by + q 2 =N due to birthday attacks. In Section 3.3 we consider the counter-less encryption scheme in which to encrypt plaintext M, w e c hoose t distinct random values r 1 ; : : : ; r t and set the ciphertext to r 1 ; : : : ; r t ; F r 1 ; : : : ; r t M . Theorem 3.7 bounds its insecurity b y the term of Equation 2 modulo an additive term corresponding to the insecurity o f F under tq queries. Considering the case t = 2 discussed above, for q = O p N, the new scheme has security which is close to the counter-version of the basic CTR scheme, whereas the coin-version of the basic scheme is totally insecure at q = p N. Furthermore the security gets even better with larger t.
Our improvements are more than in merely going beyond the birthday barrier. The insecurity o f the parity construct grows much more slowly with q than the insecurity of constructs from Figure 1 when q p N. This is true already with t = 2 , and with t = 3 the gap is quite large. For more information see the plots in Figure 3 . Integrity amplification and message authentication. In the Carter-Wegman paradigm 17 , the MAC of message M is C;hMfC, where C is a counter value, f is a pseudorandom function PRF, and h is a -AXU hash function 10 . When trying to make this stateless by substituting a random string for C, security drops to the birthday bound. The same situation arises in the XOR MAC s c hemes of 4 . A counter based variant of their scheme has high security, but the stateless version substitutes a random value for the counter and security drops to the birthday bound. The modi ed stateless Carter-Wegman MAC scheme we propose is that the MAC o f message M ber 1 ; : : : ; r t ; h M F r 1 ; : : : ; r t where r 1 ; : : : ; r t 2 f 0 ; 1 g n are random but distinct points, and f;hare as before. Here t is a parameter, and the higher we set it, the more security w e get, though each increment t o t costs one extra application of the PRF.
The pseudorandomness of the parity construct does not by itself guarantee security of the above due to the fact that an adversary in a MAC setting is allowed an active attack, and can attempt a forgery in which the values r 1 ; : : : ; r t are of its own choice. We propose another property o f the parity construct we call integrity". We again reduce the analysis to the question of whether the matrix associated to the points on which the parity function is evaluated has a certain property, which we call vulnerability" and is de ned in Section 4. Improvement over the birthday bound occurs only at t 3. Speci cally, for odd t, Lemma N t=2 , which is tight. Note that this expression is inferior to the one obtained in Equation 2. Still, it su ces for our applications. We apply this to get Theorem 4.4, an analysis of the security of the MAC s c heme discussed above.
Discussion and related work
One should note that getting security b e y ond the birthday bound both in the case where one uses counters, and in our setting where one does not requires that we use a pseudorandom function family which itself has security b e y ond the birthday bound. This precludes the direct use of block ciphers; since they are permutations, their security does not go beyond the birthday bound. The question of designing pseudorandom functions with security beyond the birthday bound out of pseudorandom permutations which model block ciphers was rst considered by Bellare, Krovetz and Rogaway 7 and later by Hall, Wagner, Kelsey and Schneier 9 and Bellare and Impagliazzo 5 . These works provide several constructions that one might use. The works of 7, 9 were also motivated by the desire to get beyond the birthday bound for encryption, but were using a counter-based encryption scheme: their applications are not stateless. Shoup 16 considers various ways of providing better security tradeo s when using pseudorandom functions or permutations as masks in universal-hash function based MACs. He gets the security to decrease slower as a function of the number of queries, but does not get security b e y ond the birthday bound without the use of state.
Organization
In Section 2 we recall de nitions of pseudorandom functions, encryption schemes and MAC s c hemes and their security. Section 3 considers the pseudorandomness of parity and its application to encryption, while Section 4 considers the integrity properties of parity and their application to message authentication. A wider perspective is provided in the Appendix A where we consider an arbitrary randomized process which is being applied iteratively on the same random-pad or random function.
De nitions
Primitives discussed in this paper include pseudorandom function families 8 , symmetric encryption schemes, and MACs. Security o f all these will be treated in a concrete framework along the lines of works like 6, 2 . Since this approach i s b y n o w used in many places, we will brie y summarize the concepts and terms we need.
The de nitional paradigm we employ is to associate to any s c heme an insecurity function which, given some set of parameters de ning resource limitations, returns the maximum possible success probability o f a n a d v ersary limited to the given resources. The de nition of success" various with the goal of the primitive, as do the resources considered.
Throughout the paper we assume some xed RAM model of computation and measure computation time of a given algorithm on certain inputs by the number of steps in this model. This enables us to consider the computational complexity of tasks de ned on nite domains. When we refer below to running time" we mean the time in this sense, plus the size of the description of the algorithm namely, the code.
Pseudorandom function families. Notion of 8 , concretized as per 6 . To a family F of functions in which each function maps f0; 1g n to f0; 1g m we associate an insecurity function InSec prf F;; de ned as follows: For integers q;T the quantity InSec prf F;q;T is the maximum possible advantage" that an adversary can obtain in distinguishing between the cases where its given oracle is a random memberofF or a truly random function of f0; 1g n to f0; 1g m , when the adversary is restricted to q oracle queries and running time T.
More precisely let R be the family of all functions each mapping f0; 1g n to f0; 1g m , and F a subset of R. Goldreich q v ; T is the maximum of Succ mac A taken over over all adversaries A that make up to q a mac generation queries and q v mac veri cation queries and run for time at most T. We adopt the convention that the adversary makes a veri cation query on the attempted forgery it outputs, so that q v is always at least 1.
Conventions. In any insecurity function, we might drop the time argument T, and it is to beunderstood then that the time allowed the adversary is not restricted, meaning we are in an information theoretic setting. Indeed, this will be the important case in analyses.
3 Pseudorandomness of parity and application to encryption
We need a bit of terminology. A sequence R = r 1 ; : : : ; r t o f n -bit strings is called non-colliding if the t strings r 1 ; : : : ; r t are all distinct. We let Dn; t denote the set of all non-colliding t-sequences of n-bit strings. We let Rn; m denote the set of all functions of f0; 1g n to f0; 1g m .
Distributions and matrix connection
Parity distribution. Consider the following game. A random function f from Rn; m i s c hosen and xed. Then q non-colliding sequences, R i = r i;1 ; : : : ; r i;t for i = 1 ; : : : ; q , are chosen randomly and independently. An adversary is provided these sequences together with the q corresponding output values of the parity function, namely b i = fr i;1 f r i;t for i = 1; : : : ; q . In applications, it is typical that as long as b 1 ; : : : ; b q look like random independent m-bit strings given the other information, the adversary will not be able to derive a n y advantage" in breaking" the security o f the application, whatever that may be. This will be seen more clearly and speci cally later, but for the moment w e wish only to give some clue as to the motivation for what we n o w l o o k at. Namely, the experiment which produces the output just described, which w e call Parn; m; q; t. the maximum being over all computationally unlimited judging" algorithms J that return either 0 or 1 on any input. We would like to upper bound this. In fact we will need a stronger claim. We will de ne a certain bad" event, and upper bound its probability. We will also assert that conditioned on the bad event not occurring, the outputs of the two experiments are identically distributed. The bad event will depend only on the choices of R 1 ; : : : ; R q hence is de ned and has the same probability under both experiments. In other words, when the bad event does not occur, the outputs b 1 ; : : : ; b q of the parity experiment are random and uniform. As Proposition 3.2
indicates it follows that the statistical distance between the output distributions of the two experiments is bounded by the probability of the bad event, but applications will in fact exploit the stronger assertion.
Matrix to pseudorandomness connection. The de nition of the bad event is based on an association of a matrix to the parity distribution. This connection is taken from 4 , where it is used to analyze a MAC construction based on the XOR operation. We adapt it for our purposes. Then the bulk of our analysis focuses on this matrix. Let us now describe the matrix and explain more precisely the connection to the pseudorandomness of parity.
To any non-colliding sequence R = r 1 ; : : : ; r t of n-bit strings is associated its characteristic vector of length N = 2 n , denoted ChVecR. Namely, if we consider the values r i as representing integer numbers between 0 and N ,1 then the characteristic vector of r 1 ; : : : ; r t will have a v alue of 1 in the positions corresponding to these t numbers and 0 elsewhere. If R 1 ; : : : ; R q are non-colliding sequences we denote by MTX N;q R 1 ; : : : ; R q the q by N matrix of zeros and ones whose i-th row is ChVecR i for i = 1 ; : : : ; q . W e are interested in the rank of our matrix when it is viewed as a random variable over the choices of R 1 ; : : : ; R q from Dn; t. Speci cally, we want the matrix to have full rank, meaning rank equal to the numberofrows q. We consider the probability that this does not happen: NFRProbN Namely b 1 = fr 1;1 f r 1 ;t = P j f j , the sum being taken over all values j for which the j-th coordinate of ChVecR 1 is 1, and so on.
The following lemma says that as long as the matrix has full rank, the entries of the output vector are uniformly and independently distributed over f0; 1g m . That is, they look like the outputs of a random function with range f0; 1g m being evaluated at q distinct points. It is an adaption of a lemma of 4 to our setting, and is informally stated. We will not prove this here; the reader is referred to 4 . Lemma 3.1 Conditioned on the event that MTX N;q R 1 ; : : : ; R q is of rank q, the outputs of experiment P arn; m; q; t and experiment Rndq;t are identically distributed.
The implication in terms of the usage of the parity construct is that as long as the matrix maintains full rank, seeing the outputs of the parity construct yields no information at all to an adversary. It is just like seeing values of a random function on distinct points. Accordingly, adversarial success will only happen when the matrix is not of full rank. For this reason, our e orts are concentrated on upper bounding NFRProbN ;q;t . Before we do that, however, let us state some relations between the probability w e are considering and the statistical distance discussed earlier. Although we don't use these facts directly, they are useful in understanding the results. In other words, the statistical distance is fully captured by the probability that the matrix is not of full rank: to within a constant factor, it is both an upper and a lower bound.
Main lemma: Bound on NFRProbN ; q ; t
The heart of our analysis reduces by the above to upper bounding the probability that the matrix MTX N;q R 1 ; : : : ; R q is not of full rank when R 1 ; : : : ; R q are randomly and independently chosen non-colliding vectors. The bound is given in terms of N = 2 n ; t and q in the following lemma. Here e is the base of the natural logarithm. This yields Equation 9.
As these calculations indicate, the in uence of the second term in the bound e ectively vanishes for t 3 as long as N is reasonably large. That is why, as indicated above, there is little loss in thinking of the bound as Ot! q 2 =N t in general. The rst function is the birthday bound, refelcting the insecurity of the rst few constructions of Figure 1 . We refer to lx as the linear bound: it is that of the of Aiello and Venkatesan's Benes construction 1 , also listed in Figure 1 . The third is the bound for the pseudorandomness of the parity construct when t = 2 a s given by Corollary 3.4, and the last is the case t = 3 as given by the same Corollary. The rst graph shows the birthday behavior: function bdx g o e s t o 1 a s q hits 2 32 = p N , while the others stay small much longer. A closer look at the tail" is provided by the second graph. It indicates that insecurity function of the parity construct with t = 2 is lower than the linear function upto about q = 2 58 , then gets higher. The insecurity function of the parity construct with t = 3 h o w ever is essentially zero; at these scales it simply does not lift o the x-axis in the above pictures. In summary the parity construction with t = 2 yields essentially the same security as the best previous construction but at lower cost, while that with t = 3 yields better security and still at lower cost. rows. Then a standard birthday calculation we take the speci c estimates used here from 4 says that for 2, N t the probability of collisions is at least Proof of Lemma 3.3: The case of t = 1 corresponds to the well-known birthday bound i.e., we are interested in the probability that two r o ws have their single 1-entry in the same column. The proof thus focuses on and assumes t 2. In the following, it is understood that the probabilities are over the choices of R 1 ; : : : ; R q uniformly and independently from Dn; t. Let pN; i; t denote the probability that a i-by-N matrix over Z 2 , in which each row is a random N-string with exactly t ones, has row-sum zero. Since the probability a b o v e does not depend on which r o ws we consider we h a v e NFRProbN Thus, the probability that the rows of R sum to zero is upper bounded by the probability that R has 1-entries in at most it=2 columns. We can view the choice of a row as that of picking at random a subset of exactly t columns in which to place ones. Thus pN; i; t 
Application to encryption
See Section 2 for de nitions of encryption and PRF related terms used below. Let F beafamily of functions with domain f0; 1g n and range f0; 1g m . In practice" this will beapseudorandom function family, but the important case in the analysis is when F is the set R of all functions with the given domain and range. For simplicity we look at the problem of encrypting a message of m-bits. The methods can be adapted to encrypt messages of longer and varying lengths. CTR mode encryption. A standard mode to encrypt an m-bit message M is to pick a value r 2 f0; 1g n and set the ciphertext to r; f r M . Here f 2 F is the secret key under which encryption and decryption are performed. The counter version sets r to a counter value that is incremented with each message encrypted. Denoting it by StandardENC-Ctr, the insecurity is shown in 2 bebebounded as indicated below. For any numberq N of m-bit messages queried in a chosen-plaintext attack, setting N = 2 n InSec enc StandardENC-Ctr; qm; T 2 InSec prf F;q;T 0 + 2 , m :
15 Here T 0 = T + Oqn + m. When a stateless scheme is desired, the standard paradigm would pick r at random. A chosen-plaintext attack of q messages results in a collision in r values with probability q 2 =N, and when this happens the encryption scheme is broken, in the sense that partial information about the plaintext is leaked. We wish to apply the parity construct to get better security, comparable or superior to that of the counter version.
Our scheme. The idea is that instead of picking one point r, the encryptor picks t distinct random points r 1 ; : : : ; r t , and sets the ciphertext of M to r 1 ; : : : ; r t ; f r 1 f r t M , the setting being the same as above.
More precisely, we associate to F an encryption scheme ENCRX t F , parameterized by the integer t 1. It consists of two algorithms, one to encrypt and the other to decrypt. These algorithms are described in Figure 5 . The encryption algorithm takes as input a key f and a message M 2 f 0 ; 1 g m , while the decryption algorithm takes the same key and a ciphertext. Here f is a random member of F. It is understood that f is accessible as an oracle. When F is pseudorandom, a seed explicitly supplied to the algorithms names a particular function in the family and thus enables computation of the oracle. But the view of f as an oracle better suits the analysis. Connection to matrix rank. In the information theoretic case, the insecurity of our scheme can beupper bounded in terms of the probability that the matrix associated to the execution is not of full rank. Lemma 3.6 Let R be the family of all functions with domain f0; 1g n and range f0; 1g m , and let N = 2 n . Let t 1 and let ENCRX t R be the associated encryption scheme as de ned above. Let q 0. Then InSec enc ENCRX t R ; q m NFRProbN ;q;t :
Proof Sketch: This can be proved by combining Lemma 3.1 with the analysis of 2 .
Security of our scheme. We n o w turn to the security of a concrete instantiation of our scheme under some given pseudorandom function family F. The insecurity o f our encryption scheme will be bounded in terms of the insecurity o f F as a prf family, and the bound on the not-full-rankprobability of the matrix we h a v e computed above. 4 Integrity of parity and application to MACs
Motivational discussion and matrix connection
When the parity construct is used in an application such as MAC where the adversary is active, further properties are required to ensure security. It turns out we need to consider the following. An adversary A sees an output R 1 ; b 1 ; : : : ; R q ; b q of experiment P arn; m; q; t. Now A tries to create a non-colliding sequence R q+1 = r q +1;1 ; : : : ; r q +1;t and a value b q+1 such that R q+1 6 2 fR 1 ; : : : ; R q g and b q+1 = fr q+1;1 f r q +1;t . Notice that this is easy for A to do if there is some subset S of the rows of MTX N;q R 1 ; : : : ; R q which sums up to a N-vector v of exactly t ones, because then A can de ne R q+1 via v = ChVecR q+1 and then set b q+1 to i b i , the XOR being over all i such that ChVecR i i s a r o w i n S . W e will see that in fact this is the only condition under which A can do it. Thus we want to make sure no subset of rows S has this property. This will imply that if A creates some non-colliding sequence R q+1 6 2 fR 1 ; : : : ; R q g , then A's chance of predicting fr q+1;1 f r q +1;t correctly is at most 2 ,m . Based on this it will bepossible to prove the security of our MAC s c heme.
The problem can be formulated by extending the experiments Parn; m; q; t and Rndn; m; q to consider an adversary as discussed above. However since we w ent through that approach before, we will not do it again. Rather we will skip to the essential step and lemma based on which we can directly prove the security of the applications. This lemma is again about the probability that MTX N;q R 1 ; : : : ; R q has certain properties. We need to consider the probability that one may augment the given matrix MTX N;q R 1 ; : : : ; R q b y a r o w with t 1-entries, di erent from all current r o ws, so as to result in a matrix of rank at most q. Actually, w e will ask for a little more, to simplify the analysis.
We s a y a subset S of its rows sums is bad if it sums up to a N-vector v such that v 6 2 S but v contains exactly t 1-entries. We s a y that MTX N;q R 1 ; : : : ; R q i s t -vulnerable if one of the following is true: 1 It has two identical rows, or 2 some subset of its rows is bad. We let VulProbN ;q;t = Pr h MTX N;q R 1 ; : : : ; R q i s t -vulnerable : R 1 ; : : : ; R q R D n; t i :
The following lemma considers an arbitrary adversary that given an output of experiment P arn; m; q; t attempts to create a new R q+1 and the corresponding f value. It says that A has no better strategy than to guess, as long as the matrix is not t-vulnerable.
Lemma 4.1 Fix any adversary A that on any input R 1 ; b 1 ; : : : ; R q ; b q 2 D n; t f 0 ; 1 g m D n; t f 0 ; 1 g m outputs some R q+1 = r q+1;1 ; : : : ; r q +1;t 2 Dn; t , f R 1 ; : : : ; R q g and a string b q+1 2 f 0 ; 1 g m . In experiment Parn; m; q; t, conditioned on the event that MTX N;q R 1 ; : : : ; R q is not t-vulnerable, the probability that b q+1 = fr q+1;1 f r q +1;t is at most 2 ,m .
Motivated by this we proceed to bound VulProbN ;q;t the proof of next lemma is omitted see 3 .
Main lemma: Bound on VulProbN ; q ; t
Notice that a bad subset of the rows must have cardinality greater than 1. Also notice that if MTX N;q R 1 ; : : : ; R q is not t-vulnerable then it has full rank. The rst condition above means that no two r o ws sum to zero. If a subset T of three or more rows sums to zero, removing one row from T leaves a bad subset of rows, which the second condition disallows. 18 the last bound being due to the fact that q N = 2 b y assumption. We proceed to bound the probability that there is some bad subset. Notice that if t is odd then a subset of two r o ws cannot sum to a N-string of exactly t ones, so the smallest possible bad subset has size 3. To capture this di erence between odd and even values of t we let s = 2 i f t is even and s = 3 if t is odd. Then we can bound the probability that MTX N;q R 1 ; : : : ; R q has a bad subset of rows by The sum is the same as the one in the proof of Lemma 3.3 except that it starts at i = s rather than i = 2, and the denominator contains N rather than 2N. We can thus bound it the same way. Brie y, in breaking up the sum into two parts we c hoose this time = To complete the proof we need to determine the conditions imposed on q;tbythe requirements A; B 1=2. The calculations are similar to those in the proof of Lemma 3.3. Brie y under the condition N 2et 2 lg N it su ces that q N=2e 2 t. These conditions are imposed by the upper bounds on t and q, respectively, in the lemma statement.
Tightness of the above bound. Suppose that q N which is required and assumed anyhow. Consider, rst, an even t. Then the probability that a q-by-N matrix is t-vulnerable is lower bounded by q 2 times the probability that two t-vectors add-up to another t-vector. The probability for this event is computed by rst selecting and xing the rst vector, and next computing probability that the second vector agrees with it on exactly t=2 1-entries. The latter probability i s t=N t=2 .
For odd t, w e consider the event that three distinct t-vectors add up to a di erent t-vector. Fix any random non-overlapping choice for the rst two t-vectors, and consider the probability that the third resides fully in these 2t columns but does not equal any of the rst two vectors. The latter probability is 2t=N t . Considering all , q 3 choices of the rows, the claim follows.
Is it odd that odd t 3 is better than even t + 1 ? Considering small t's and ignoring logarithmic factors, for odd t 3 the upper bound is q 3 =N t which i s t ypically much smaller than the tight! upper bound q 2 =N t+1=2 provided for the even t+1. We note that a similar phenomenon occurs for large t's: Consider an even t = N=2. Then the probability that two random rows with t 1-entries sum-up to a r o w with t 1-entries is 1= never happens. In general, the discrepancy is due to the fact that for even t, one should consider the contribution of pairs of rows; whereas for odd t only larger subsets are relevant.
Application to message authentication
Given. Let D be some domain consisting of messages we want to authenticate. For example D could be f0; 1g , or all strings of length up to some maximum length. We x a family H of -AXU hash functions in which each function h 2 H maps from D to f0; 1g n . We also let F beafamily of functions with domain f0; 1g n and range f0; 1g m . In practice" this will beapseudorandom function family, but the important case in the analysis is when F is the set R of all functions with the given domain and range.
Universal hash based MACs. The standard paradigm is that to authenticate message M 2 D, pick a value r 2 f 0 ; 1 g n and set the mac to r; f r h M . Here hh; fi is the secret key under which macs are created and veri ed, where h 2 H and f 2 F. The counter version sets r to a counter value that is incremented with each message authenticated. Denoting it by StandardMAC-Ctr, InSec mac StandardMAC-Ctr; q a ; q v ; T q v + InSec prf F;q a +q v ; T 0 : where q a N , q v 1, N = 2 n and T 0 = T +Oq a +q v n+m. When a stateless scheme is desired, the standard paradigm would pick r at random. A c hosen-message attack o f q messages results in a collision in r values with probability q 2 = N , and when this happens forgery is possible. We wish to apply the parity construct to get better security, comparable or superior to that of the counter version.
Our scheme. The idea is that instead of picking one point r, the generator of the mac picks t distinct random points r 1 ; : : : ; r t , and sets the mac of M to r 1 ; : : : ; r t ; f r 1 f r t h M , the setting being the same as above.
More precisely, with H xed we associate to F a message authentication scheme MACRX t F , parameterized by the integer t 1. It consists of two algorithms, one to generate macs, and the other to verify candidate macs. The distinction is necessary since the mac generation algorithm is probabilistic. These algorithms are described in Figure 5 . The mac generation algorithm takes as input a key hh; fi and a message M 2 D, while the veri cation algorithm takes the same key, a message, and a candidate mac for it. Here h is a random hash function from H while f is a random memberofF. It is understood that f is accessible as an oracle. When F is pseudorandom, a seed explicitly supplied to the algorithms names a particular function in the family and thus enables computation of the oracle. But the view of f as an oracle better suits the analysis.
We stress one aspect of the veri cation procedure, namely to check that the candidate tag really contains t points not more or less and that these are distinct. Without this check, forgery is possible. Connection to matrix vulnerability. In the information theoretic case, the insecurity of our scheme can be upper bounded in terms of the quality o f H as an AXU family namely , the vulnerability of the matrix associated to the number of authentication queries involved, and a term corresponding to guessing a correct mac in the numberofveri cation queries involved. Lemma 4.3 Let H be a family of -AXU hash functions with range f0; 1g n . Let R be the family of all functions with domain f0; 1g n and range f0; 1g m . Let t 1 and let MACRX t R be the associated MAC as de ned above. Let q a ; q v 1. Then InSec mac MACRX t R ; q a ; q v q v + V ulProb2 n ; q a ; t : Proof Sketch: This uses the same ideas as the standard connection between universal hashing and MACs so we only indicate brie y the source of the various terms in the bound. Consider an adversary A making q a authentication queries and q v veri cation queries. First assume for simplicity the veri cation queries are all made after all the authentication queries are complete.
The authentication queries give rise to a matrix MTX N;q R 1 ; : : : ; R q . If this matrix is t-vulnerable, we give up, accounting for this term in the bound. So assume not. As observed above, non-tvulnerable implies full rank so by Lemma 3.1 the adversary is getting no information about h via the authentication queries. By Lemma 4.1 it is also getting no information about the XOR of f on the entries in some new non-colliding t-sequence. Thus its chance of forgery is limited by q v .
Finally, one must deal with the veri cation queries. If no information has been released, guessing is the only possible strategy. Security of our scheme. We n o w turn to the security of a concrete instantiation of our scheme under some given pseudorandom function family F. The insecurity of our message authentication scheme will be bounded in terms of the insecurity o f F as a prf family, the quality o f the AXU family H, the bound on matrix vulnerability we have computed above, and the guessing term mentioned just above. We focus on the case of odd t because our bounds are better here. On the insufficiency of the full rank condition in the MAC setting. We show that for ensuring the security against forgery of the MAC scheme, presented in Section 4.3 and in Since we assumed the M i were random messages in f0; 1g 2n then with very high probability M is di erent than all previously queried messages as the M i 's are linearly independent, and the forgery is successful.
message bit m. Each time, the function g is selected according to some xed probability distribution We are interested in the growth rate of this function, as a function of q, for xed N. Furthermore, we w ant to construct e cient function speci ers for which this value is as low as possible.
A.1 Lower bounds
To guide our study we consider some lower bounds. We start by observing that the discrepancy cannot bezero as soon as we output more than one bit. This is in contrast to the stateful case, where the distance may remain zero upto N bits.
Proposition A.3 DistFnSp; N ; q 0, for any function speci er FnSp and any q 2.
Proof: There is a non-zero probability that the random strings R 1 ; R 2 c hosen in the rst two tries are equal. In this case, in the rst experiment, we get back the same bit both times. In the random experiment, we get back independent random bits both times.
On the other hand, it is clear that one cannot out-perform the stateful schemes. That is, Shannon's bounds continue to hold here. It is useful to visualize the set S being chosen item by item. That is, for every j = 1 ; :::; N, put j in S with probability one-half. Note that the Full Parity Function Speci er is very bad in terms of integrity i.e., for the application to MACs: Given two invocations of it, S 1 FuParSpN and S 2 FuParSpN, and the values S 1 pad and S 2 pad, an active adversary may set S to be the symmetric di erence of S 1 and S 2 , and predict the value S pad = S 1 p ad S 2 pad. However, the Full Parity Function Speci er fares very well with respect to a passive attack i.e., the pseudorandomness property equivalent to discrepancy: Proposition A.7 For any N and q 1 the discrepancy of the full parity function speci er is upper bounded as follows: DistFuParSp; N ; q 2 q 2 N :
Proof: By the above proposition, the statistical distance between FnSp N;q and Rand N;q is bounded above by the probability that the associated matrix is not of full rank. This probability i s easily As explained in the introduction, the full parity function speci er is useless in applications such a s ours where we need to operate in polyn-time, where n = l g N . Recall that in practice the N-bit random pad, pad, will be de ned by a succinct pseudorandom function f : f0; 1g n ! f 0 ; 1 g . This leads to our main results which refer to partity function speci ers for which the subset of XORed bits is small.
De nition A.8 An function speci er is called a t-parity function speci er if it always outputs functions S 2 Lin N so that jSj = t. The t-uniform parity function speci er selects uniformly a t-subset, S, and outputs S .
Our main result is Theorem A.9 For any t 1, the t-uniform parity function speci er has discrepancy at most d 1 t q 2 N t . This result follows immediately by combining Proposition A.6 and Lemma 3.3.
